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Abstract 
This paper investigates the causal relationship between firms' bank dependence 
and financial constraints by utilizing the 2008 financial crisis and its impact on the 
Japanese economy as a natural experiment. Since the Japanese banking sector 
remained healthy while the corporate bond markets were paralyzed, firms that had 
reduced bank dependence were hit heavily by the shock. I examined whether 
firms with large holdings of corporate bonds maturing in 2008 were financially 
constrained, by comparing the changes in their investment expenditures and 
borrowing conditions with those of bank-dependent firms. The main empirical 
results show that (1) firms with large holdings of corporate bonds maturing in 
2008 did not cut investment expenditures; (2) instead, they observed higher 
increments in bank loans; and (3) firms that maintained relatively close bank-firm 
relationships had more access to bank loans with low borrowing costs, but 
significant differences in investment expenditures were not found. These findings 
imply that although there is a cost to reducing bank dependence, it is not very high 
for Japanese listed firms. 
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1 Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis did severe damage to almost every economy. It is an 
urgent task for economists to shed light on the causes and remedies for the crisis. The 
crisis also provides us the chance to investigate the causal links between financial 
shocks and the real economy, which are usually difficult to identify. This paper utilizes 
the crisis as a natural experiment to examine if a close bank-firm relationship mitigates 
firms’ financial constraints. Since the Japanese banking system remained robust even as 
the commercial paper and corporate bond markets (hereafter referred to as capital 
markets) experienced a functional decline after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, data 
from Japanese markets demonstrate how banks reacted to increases in the loan demand 
from less bank-dependent firms, separate from the banks’ health problem.
3 
Before the 1980s, Japanese firms were highly dependent on bank loans and the 
bank-centered financial system (called the main bank system) was considered to 
mitigate the problem of asymmetric information between firms and banks. However, 
firms have incentives to reduce their dependency on their banks because close 
bank-firm relationships can cause hold-ups through an information monopoly (Sharpe, 
1990; Rajan, 1992; Houston and James, 1996; Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; Pinkowitz 
and Williamson, 2000). Certainly, after the financial liberalization in the 1980s, the 
structure of corporate finance in Japan changed dramatically and a number of firms 
began issuing bonds (Shirasu and Xu, 2007).   
Reducing bank dependency is expected to be effective in mitigating hold-ups but it 
also involves costs. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990, hereafter HKS) 
demonstrate that firms that tried to become less dependent on banks during the 1980s 
were financially constrained compared to firms that kept close relationships with the 
banks. That is, if firms reduce bank dependency, their access to bank loans will be 
limited, making information asymmetries between firms and banks more serious.   
It is important for both economists and policy-makers to understand how much it 
costs the firms to reduce their bank dependency. Following the discussions of 
                                                  
3  Throughout this paper, the extent of bank dependency is defined by the ratio of bank loan balances 
to total liabilities with interest. Therefore, less bank-dependent firms are more dependent on bond 
markets. Similar measures have been used in existing literature such as Hoshi, Kashyap, and 
Scharfstein (1990), Pinkowitz and Williamson (2000) and Houston and James (2000). 3 
 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), who analyze the role of indirect finance, the main cost of 
the disintermediation is that firms lose their insurance against liquidity shocks. Certainly, 
in Japan, it has been suggested that one of the advantages of the main bank system is 
that firms are supplied with implicit insurance so that they can be rescued by their main 
banks in the face of liquidity shocks (Osano and Tsutsui, 1985; Sheard, 1989). 
Therefore, losing such functions in the course of financial liberalization can result in 
capital market shocks being more easily propagated into the real economy.   
Despite its importance, HKS’s methodology that measures the extent of financial 
constraints by the sensitivities of cash flows in reduced form investment functions has 
been criticized (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Hovakimian and Titman, 2006).
4 From an 
empirical point of view, the simultaneity of the firms’ investments and financing 
decisions makes it difficult for researchers to identify the causal relationship. As 
Hovakimian and Titman (2006) suggest, the most serious criticism is the possibility that 
cash flows also reflect investment opportunities that cannot be controlled by Tobin’s q. 
In other words, the reason firms can earn cash flows may be related to the fact that they 
have profitable investment projects. Since Tobin’s average q is measured by the market 
value, which reflects the investors’ evaluations, the sensitivities of cash flows could be 
larger for firms suffering from severe asymmetric information problems between 
themselves and their investors. 
In order to overcome this limitation, a number of researches have tried to determine 
the exogenous events wherein firms’ cash flows were altered independent of investment 
opportunities. For example, Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) focus on 
the investment activities of firms that experienced cash windfalls in the U.S. Likewise, 
Lamont (1997) compares the investment expenditures of non-oil subsidiaries of oil 
companies with those of non-oil companies during the 1986 oil price decline. These 
studies reject the complete capital market hypothesis, that is, firms are financially 
                                                  
4 HKS (1990, 1991) follow the method proposed by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988). They 
examine the differences in the cash flow sensibilities between firms that are a priori considered to be 
suffering from severe asymmetric information (between firms and investors) and firms that not. The 
basic idea is that if firms are required to set high lemon premiums as a result of asymmetric 
information, their investment expenditures are restricted to the amount of cash on hand. If close 
bank-firm relationships reduce the asymmetric information between firms and banks (and 
consequently lemon premiums), the firms’ investment expenditures are expected to be less sensitive 
to their cash flows. HKS (1990) observed higher cash flow sensitivities among keiretsu firms that 
had increased their dependency on the bond markets in the 1980s. 4 
 
constrained when they make capital investments. However, they failed to obtain 
adequate sample sizes.
5 
Recent empirical literature focuses on large-scale exogenous financial shocks to firms. 
Chava and Purnanandam (2010) utilize the Russian financial crisis in 1998 as an 
exogenous shock to the U.S. banking sector in order to show that bank-dependent firms 
experienced a larger decline in their investment expenditures as compared to those that 
had access to bond markets during the period. Almeida et al. (2009) try to specify more 
clearly the firms that may have experienced financial constraints during the recent 
global financial crisis. They focus on the firm’s debt maturity structure and demonstrate 
that the U.S. firms that had large amounts of maturing long-term debts (more than 20% 
of existing long-term debts) reduced their investment expenditures significantly.   
Following the recent empirical literature, this paper utilizes the 2008 financial crisis 
as a natural experiment to examine the question of whether it is costly for firms to 
reduce their bank dependency and, if so, what is the cost. In Japan, it was reported that 
the corporate bond markets were paralyzed during the crisis, while the banking sector 
stayed relatively healthy (Bank of Japan, 2009a, 2009b). Firms that had reduced their 
bank dependency were therefore hit most heavily by the financial shock. The 
identification strategy of this paper makes use of this fact and focuses on the firms’ 
maturity compositions of liabilities. That is, for “unlucky” firms that had issued large 
amounts of corporate bonds that matured during the crisis, refinance by issuing new 
bonds became difficult. As a result of the exogenous shock, their demand for bank loans 
shifted outward. As discussed in HKS (1990), if the problem of asymmetric information 
between firms and banks worsens by reducing bank dependency, these unlucky firms 
would face financial constraints because their banks require high lemon premiums or 
may possibly reject their loan applications (rationing). As a result, their investment 
expenditures are expected to decline, other things being equal. 
This paper classifies firms that had maturing bonds as “treated groups” and examines 
whether they were financially constrained. This is done by comparing their investment 
expenditures and borrowing conditions during the crisis with those of bank-dependent 
                                                  
5 Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) and Lamont (1997) obtained only 11 and 39 
observations, respectively.   5 
 
firms, whose economic attributes were considered to be ex-ante identical.
6 
The empirical results of this paper are summarized as follows. First, the firms with 
large amounts of corporate bonds maturing in 2008 did not cut their investment 
expenditure, as compared with bank-dependent firms. Second, bank loan balances 
increased sharply for those firms with less bank dependency. Finally, the treated firms 
that kept relatively close bank-firm relationships had more access to bank loans with 
low borrowing costs, but significant differences between their investment expenditure 
and that of bank-dependent firms were not observed. These findings suggest that it is 
not that costly for the recent Japanese listed firms to reduce their bank dependency. That 
is, the problem of asymmetric information between firms and banks is not that serious. 
This study contributes to the existing empirical literature on corporate finance and 
banking with regards to bank-firm relationships and the role of the banking sectors by 
providing causal evidence. In addition, it adds to the literature on credit channels of 
monetary policy, such as Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and Kashyap and Stein (2000), by 
examining the heterogeneous effects of financial shocks. Finally, this paper is also 
related to the studies of the Japanese economy. Although Japan was not the epicenter of 
the 2008 financial crisis, its real economy was the most severely damaged among 
advanced economies. This paper attempts to examine whether the huge and rapid 
economic shrinkage that Japan experienced in the last two quarters of FY2008 was 
related to the shocks in the capital markets. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section, I describe the 
changes in the Japanese capital market during the 2008 financial crisis to explain my 
identification strategy. Section 3 describes the data set, which is followed by the 
empirical results described in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the results and their 
implications, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Identification Strategies  
                                                  
6 The identification strategy of this paper follows that of Almeida et al. (2009). However, since the 
Japanese banking sector, unlike its U.S. counterpart, was not so damaged by the global financial 
shock, it enables an examination of the role of the banking sector separately from bank health 
problems. In addition, I categorize firms that may have been financial constrained into more than 
two groups according to their volumes of maturing bonds by extending the methodology to multiple 
treatment models. This allows greater quantitative results to be obtained. 6 
 
This paper examines whether the problem of asymmetric information between firms and 
banks becomes serious if firms reduce their bank dependency. To test the hypothesis, I 
focus on the changes in the Japanese capital market during the 2008 financial crisis, 
which had unique characteristics as compared to those of other advanced economies. 
Here, while the capital markets were paralyzed, the banking sector remained relatively 
healthy. 
Bank of Japan (2009a, 2009b) reports that the capital markets were paralyzed in the 
last half of FY2008 (2008Q4-2009Q1, see Figure 1). For example, firms with ratings 
below “A” could not raise bonds at all during the period and even the public sector, like 
the issuers of government guaranteed bonds and the local governments, decided to 
postpone their scheduled issuances. The Bank of Japan also reports that this market 
turmoil was related to the decline in the investors’ risk appetites. The most recent 
empirical analysis on the Japanese capital markets certainly supports this hypothesis 
(Oyama and Hongo, 2010).
7  
Other countries experienced similar capital market paralysis after the collapse of the 
Lehman brothers. The banking system in Japan remained healthy unlike other advanced 
economies. Therefore, in Japan, firms that had reduced bank dependency were hit most 
heavily by the crisis in terms of financing activities. According to Bank of Japan (2009a, 
2009b), the main reason behind Japanese banks escaping the fate of their global 
counterparts was that their exposure to securitized products was very limited. In this 
sense, the fact that Japanese banks could not succeed in their investment bank 
businesses turned out to be a key factor in the preservation of their functions as 
commercial banks. 
In order to examine the above hypothesis, this paper focuses on the maturity 
compositions of liabilities held by the firms. That is, for firms that had large amounts of 
corporate bonds maturing in 2008, it became difficult to refinance by issuing new bonds 
and their demand for bank loans shifted outwards. If the problem of asymmetric 
information was serious for these less bank-dependent firms, their banks did not extend 
sufficient loans (or required higher “lemon premiums”) and these firms would have 
                                                  
7  Although the causes of a functional decline in the capital markets and the international propagation 
of financial market shocks themselves are urgent subjects of empirical analysis, I leave them for the 
future research.   7 
 
become financially constrained. Besides, the more the volume of maturing bonds firms 
had, the more financial constraints they faced, because more finance was needed to 
repay their debts. Accordingly, they observed both, a decline in their investment 
expenditures and an increase in the borrowing costs, and the extent of these would be 
larger in keeping with the greater volume of maturing bonds. Conversely, if the problem 
of information asymmetries did not become serious, no decline in investment 
expenditures but an increase in bank loan balances would be observed. Since it is easy 
for firms to borrow from banks, they use bank loan extensions to cover the cash flow 
lost through bond repayments. Therefore, I set firms with issued bonds maturing in 
2008 as treated groups and estimate the treatment effects on investment expenditures 
and borrowing conditions, allowing the effects to differ according to the amount of 
maturing bonds. 
This paper employs propensity score matching methods, which are often applied in 
the analysis of medical science (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman, Ichimura, and 
Todd, 1997). In doing so, I take the effect of cigarette smoking on a person’s health as 
an example to understand the basic idea behind the method. Whether a person smokes is 
called “treatment” and the group composed of smokers is called the “treatment group.” 
Likewise, the group of non-smokers is called the “non-treated group.” However, it is 
impossible to measure the effect of smoking on health by just comparing the average 
health status between the two groups. This is because people who are stressed are more 
likely to smoke even as the stress also damages their health.   
Now, each smoker is matched with a non-smoker who has the same attributes. This 
non-smoker is called a “control sample.” After conditioning on the factors that affect the 
decision to smoke (called “covariates”), whether a person smokes is determined 
randomly. Factors such as damage to health through stress are expected to be the same 
between the two people. Therefore, the observed average difference in health status, 
called the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT), has causal effects. However, it 
is difficult to find control samples as the dimension of covariates becomes larger. 
Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) method proposes to use the estimated probabilities 
(called “propensity scores”) for matching those that are obtained from probit regressions 
of the treatment status on covariates. Samples with the same propensity scores basically 8 
 
have similar covariates, given the parameter estimates. 
This paper assumes that the crisis was highly exogenous to Japanese individual firms, 
because it is apparent that the investment or financing activities of individual Japanese 
firms was not the cause of the crisis.
8 However, the assumption does limit the treated 
firms (or less bank-dependent firms) to those that had ever issued corporate bonds. This 
means that the distribution of the firms’ attributes (such as firm size, investment 
opportunities, and leverages) might be different between treated and non-treated firms 
(or bank-dependent firms). Therefore, I need make adjustments to randomize the 
treatment. For this purpose, I employ the method of matching estimators to calculate the 
treatment effects (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997). 
In the next subsection, I explain the econometric methodologies in detail. 
 
2.1 Matching Estimators 
In order to estimate the treatment effects allowing for heterogeneity in the volume of 
maturing bonds, this paper utilizes the multiple propensity score matching technique 
proposed by Lechner (2002). Lechner’s method is a natural extension of the binomial 
treatment model introduced by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to multiple treatments.   
The applications of Rosenbaum and Rubin’s method are basically limited to the case 
where the treatment status is binomial. Therefore, it is highly restrictive when the actual 
treatment is continuous or multiple. In the example of cigarette smoking, by defining 
the treatment status as only whether the person smokes or not, the treatment effects on 
the “light” smokers are assumed to be the same as on “heavy” smokers.   
Lechner’s method is aimed at bridging this discrepancy. Although I refer the reader to 
Lechner (2002) for a detailed discussion on his matching estimator, this paper considers 
the validity of the so-called strongly ignorable treatment assignment assumption. To do 
this, the set of covariates, treatment statuses that happen to agents and the corresponding 
counterfactual outcomes are defined as X, D={1,2,…,M}, and {Y(1), Y(2),…, Y(M)} 
                                                  
8 As Peek and Rosengren (1997) emphasize, it is difficult to isolate demand and supply shocks in 
the usual reduced form analysis. They use the Japanese banking crisis in the 1990s as an exogenous 
negative loan supply shock to the Japanese banks in the U.S. and show the negative real effect on 
construction activities in the U.S. Their empirical findings also provide evidence of the international 
propagation of financial shocks. 9 
 
respectively. We can once again return to the cigarette smoking allegory. Covariates are 
personal attributes that affect smoking decisions (such as stress and lifestyle) and 
treatment statuses mean the number of cigarettes that a person smokes per day. 
Counterfactual outcomes are health statuses that might have been realized according to 
the treatment status. Then the condition can be expressed as follows. 
    . | )} ( ),..., 2 ( ), 1 ( { X D M Y Y Y    (1) 
It means that treatment statuses are independent of outcomes after controlling the 
attributes. In the smoking example, this assumption implies that smoking decisions are 
only dependent on personal attributes and never on future health statuses. That is, 
people whose health is more affected by smoking are not allowed to stop smoking or 
reduce the number of cigarette. Beyond this example, in many applications of matching 
estimators, it is doubtful if this condition holds because the treatments themselves are 
usually dependent on the agents’ decisions (agents who expect higher outcomes are 
more likely to apply for the programs). For the purpose of this paper however, 
treatments or whether firms had issued corporate bonds that matured during the crisis 
are predetermined and they could not avoid the shock unless they had already 
anticipated it.
9 Therefore, it is reasonable to employ matching estimators the factors 
that affect firms’ motives to issue bonds can be controlled. With regard to the treatment 
status D, four categories are defined according to the number of bonds that matured in 
2008, and the treatment effects are expected to be larger in accordance with the number. 
According to Lechner’s method, the concrete estimation steps are as follows, 
contextualized for the purpose of this study. First, four categories (B0, B1, B2, B3, B4) 
are set according to the volume of bonds matured in 2008, as shown in Table 1. In the 
second step, each firm’s probabilities of falling into B0, B1, B2, B3, or B4 are estimated, 
conditional on the firms’ attributes (Tobin’s q, cash-flows, firm-sizes, default-risks, 
cash-holdings, leverages, bank-firm-relationships, and industry-dummies) by the 
multinomial probit model: 
                                                  
9  Firms could have avoided to be “treated” if they anticipated the crisis in advance, for example, by 
buying the maturing bonds back and issuing new bonds while the market was normal. It is known 
although that the strongly ignorable treatment assignment assumption cannot be tested statistically 
(see Cameron and Trivedi, 2005), but I consider this predictability roughly in the later section. 10 
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The selection of covariates X follows the method proposed by Almeida et al. (2009). 
However, Altman’s Z score (Altman, 2002) is used as a measure of default risks instead 
of ratings, because only a select number of firms managed to acquire them from 
institutes such as Standard and Poor’s and Moody’s.
10 
In the third step, I make four subsamples, (B1, B0), (B2, B0), (B3, B0), and (B4, B0), 
and calculate the conditional probability that firms fall into B1, B2, B3 and B4 in each 
pair using the estimated multinomial probit probabilities. Considering any two different 
categories {l,m} in D, they will be 
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In this paper, I investigate the effects of the financial crisis on investment expenditures 
and borrowing conditions of firms with large volumes of maturing bonds by estimating 
the ATT. This is defined as an average deviation between the actual outcomes of treated 
firms and their counterfactual outcomes namely, the outcomes that might have been 
realized if the firms were not treated. In this study, counterfactual outcomes refer to how 
the treated firms’ investment expenditures and borrowing conditions would have 
evolved after the financial crisis if they had not issued corporate bonds at all. When l 
and m are set to be a treated group and a non-treated group respectively, the ATT can be 
expressed as follows. 
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The second term of the right hand side calculates the counterfactual outcome. ATTs as 
defined above are allowed to be different depending on the selected l and m. Intuitively, 
                                                  
10  Altman’s revisited Z score is defined as  Z  0.717T1    	0.847T2    	3.107T3    	0.420T4    	0.998T5. 
Here     is the ratio of quick asset minus current liability to total assets.    is the ratio of earned 
reserve to total assets,     is the ratio of pretax net profit plus interest paid to total assets,    is  the 
ratio of net book value to total liabilities, and      is the ratio of sales to total assets. The probability 
of a firm’s bankruptcy is considered to get lower as the Z value becomes larger. 11 
 
ATTs can purely extract the effects of the maturing bonds because treated firms were 
matched with control firms, which are ex-ante identical except in the extent of their 
bank dependence. Therefore, the ATT estimators suggest a “causal effect.” 
Practically, ATTs are estimated in the following way.   
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Firms in categories B1, B2, B3, and B4 are defined as treatment groups and firms in B0, 
whose conditional propensity scores are closest to each treated firm, are defined as 
control firms. For each treated firm, the control firms are matched and differences in the 
outcome between the two groups are calculated.   
There is another important assumption called the balancing condition, which states 
that, for those firms sharing the same conditional propensity scores, treatment statuses 
should be independent of covariates. If we suppose the function  ) ( 1    to be an indicator, 
then the condition can be written as 
   
| 1( | , , ) | ( )
ll m Sl Sl o r Sm X P x    .  (6) 
It means that there are no differences in the distributions of the covariates between 
treated and control firms, that is, the treatments are randomized. Unlike a strongly 
ignorable treatment assignment assumption, these conditions can be tested statistically. 
This paper therefore checks them to consider the validity of selected covariates. 
With respect to the matching methods, caliper matching and 10 nearest neighbors 
matching is undertaken. In both calculations, the control firms are matched with their 
replacements and imposed a maximal tolerance level on the maximal propensity score 
distance (radius matching). The tolerance level is set to the absolute value of 0.01 (or 
1%) and the treated samples that cannot find control firms within the radius are 
discarded. The weights  ) , ( j i w  in the above equation are therefore set to 1 or 0.1 for 
each control firms depending on the matching method.
11 
In order to eliminate the firms’ unobservable factors that affect outcome variables (or 
fixed effects), differenced outcome variables are used to estimate ATTs. That is to say, 
                                                  
11 For details of the implementations of propensity score matching estimators, see Caliendo and 
Kopeinig (2008) for example. 12 
 
they are propensity score difference-in-differences matching estimators (Hereafter 




As mentioned in an earlier section, this paper uses Japanese listed firms’ financial 
statements and corporate information such as market capitalizations and the 
compositions of major shareholders and the stock market where firms are listed. The 
former was extracted from the “Nikkei NEEDS CD-ROM” (hereafter, Nikkei-NEEDS) 
published by Nikkei Inc. and the latter from the “Japanese Company Handbook 
Quarterly” published by Toyo Keizai Inc. My data set is composed of non-financial and 
non-agricultural firms listed on the Sapporo, Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, and Fukuoka Stock 
Exchanges and stock markets for emerging firms such as Jasdaq, Mothers, and Hercules, 
which settle accounts in March.   
The treatment statuses (B0, B1, B2, B3, and B4) are classified according to the 
variable MATURITY, which is defined as the ratio of the amount of corporate bond 
balances that had matured in FY2008 (2008Q2-2009Q1) to the sum of liabilities with 
interest (short-term bank loans (Nikkei-NEEDS’ FB075), long-term bank loans 
(FB076+FB101), commercial papers (FB075), and corporate bonds (FB078+FB099)).
12 
Firms that had no outstanding balances of bond or commercial paper at the end of 
FY2007 (therefore, they did not have any maturing bond either) are classified as 
bank-dependent firms (B0). This definition is similar to those of previous literature such 
as HKS (1990) and Pinkowitz and Williamson (2000), which examines the effect of 
bank dependency. The “lucky” firms that had positive outstanding balances of bonds but 
none of which matured in FY2008 are classified as B1. Firms in category B2 had issued 
a small number of bonds (less than 5% of total liabilities with interest) that matured in 
FY2008. Similarly, firms in B3 or B4 had issued a medium number (5–10% of total 
liabilities with interest) or a large number (more than 10% of total liabilities with 
interest) of bonds matured in FY2008, respectively. I therefore expected that the latter 
                                                  
12  In order to specify the amount, I use the reported balances of corporate bond that were scheduled 
to mature within 1 year (FB078) at the end of FY2007 (March 2008). 13 
 
categories would have larger treatment effects for firms. 
As discussed earlier, in order to estimate PSM-DIDs, this paper controls the Tobin’s q, 
cash flows, firm size, default risks, cash holdings, leverages, bank-firm relationships, 
and industry-dummies as covariates. Constructions of these variables basically follow 
Almeida et al. (2009). Tobin’s q (Q) is defined as the ratio of market capitalization plus 
total assets (FB063) minus net assets (FB166) minus differed taxes (FB056) to total 
assets. Cash flow (CF) is the sum of net income (FC058) plus depreciation (FC046) 
divided by the lag of fixed tangible assets (FB032). Size (lnASSET) is defined as the 
natural log of total assets. Default risk (RATING) is calculated according to Altman’s 
definition.
13  Cash holding (CASH) is defined as the ratio of quick assets (FB02) to total 
assets. Leverage or capital ratio (CAP) is defined as the ratio of net assets to total assets. 
On the bank-firm relationships (MAINBANK), a dummy variable is constructed, which 
takes on a value of 1 if there is more than one bank in the list of major shareholders. 
Industry dummies are constructed by utilizing the 2-digit codes of “Japan Standardized 
Industrial Classification (JSIC)” ver.12. I also limit the stock markets where the firms 
are listed: dummy variables MARKET1-MARKET4 stand for Tokyo stock exchange 
first section; Tokyo stock exchange second section; regional stock exchanges (Sapporo, 
Nagoya, Osaka and Fukuoka stock exchanges); and stock markets for emerging firms 
(Jasdaq, Mothers, and Hercules), respectively. Detailed definitions of each variable are 
shown in Tables 1 and 2. Following Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), I use lagged values 
(values at March 2007) of each covariate in the estimation. 
When it comes to the outcome variables, this paper focuses not only on the changes 
in investment expenditures (INVEST) but also on the changes in bank loan balances and 
borrowing costs. This includes log of total bank loan balances (lnLOAN); log of short 
and long-term bank loan balances (lnSHORT and lnLONG); and bank loan interest rates 
(RATE)).
14 Here the variable INVEST is defined as the ratio of capital expenditure 
(CAPEX, FP01143) to the lag of fixed tangible assets (FB032) and RATE is defined as 
the ratio of interest paid on bank loans (FC016-FC017-FC018-FC124-FC125) to 
                                                  
13  See Altman (2002) for details. 
14 In terms of the calculations of lnSHORT and lnLONG, it turns out that some firms had no 
outstanding balance of short or long-term bank loans. If they are eliminated, quite a few samples will 
be discarded. To deal with this problem, I add 1 to short and long bank loan balances before taking 
the logs for firms with positive outstanding balances of total bank loans. 14 
 
two-year averaged total bank loan balances (FB075+FB076+FB101).
15 
 
3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 3. It indicates that there is a sufficient number 
of treated and control firms to obtain trustworthy results. Each treated category (B1-B4) 
has no less than 100 samples and about 60% of total observations are classified as a 
non-treated group (B0). Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 show the subsample means of each 
category and indicate that there are differences in covariates between the treated and 
control firms. For example, Tobin's q is slightly higher for treated firms on average and 
control firms are, on the whole, smaller in terms of asset size. Against intuition, the 
average RATING is higher for non-treated firms. As for outcome variables, some 
variables also show differences among categories. Especially, the average growth of 
bank loan balances (lnLOAN) for firms in B3 and B4 are about 14% and 23% 
respectively, while those for non-treated firms are only about 4%. On the other hand, 
contrary to prior expectations, INVEST and RATE show small differences. 
In this paper, observations that are larger or smaller than 99.5 or 0.5 percentile points 
of each variable are eliminated as outliers. Nevertheless, outcome variables show large 
heterogeneity. Since the calculations of the ATT estimators are based on averages, they 
are weak in dealing with outliers. I examine whether the outliers affect the results by 
adopting alternative econometric methods in the next section.   
 
4 Estimation Results 
Table 5.1, Table 5.2 and Table 6 show the main estimation results. First, the marginal 
effects of MNP (Table 5.2) indicate that firms are more likely to issue bonds as their 
asset sizes become larger and the levels of cash holdings, capital ratios, and ratings 
become lower. Although significant differences in investment opportunities (Tobin’s q) 
and cash flows are not observed, their estimated coefficients differ slightly among the 
                                                  
15 For example, RATE in FY2008 is calculated as the bank loan interests paid in FY2008, divided 
by the average bank loan balances from FY2007 to FY2008. This definition allows us to take into 
account the changes in the bank loan balances for the same period compared to the usual calculation 
that divides interest expenditures by the lag of loan balances (Caballero, Hoshi, and Kashyap, 2008). 15 
 
categories (Table 5.1). Therefore, in principle, it enables us to match the control firms 
whose Tobin’s q and cash flows are also close to each treated firm. 
Some of above results might be related to reverse causalities. The firms’ past bond 
issuances make recent leverages higher and, consequently, default risks are also 
heightened by definition. However, the main purpose of MNP estimation is to control 
the firms’ attributes by constructing propensity scores and not to estimate the structural 
parameters. These problems, therefore, are not fundamentally serious. 
The kernel density functions of the conditional propensity scores for the treated and 
non-treated groups are shown in Figure 2. Here, the conditional propensity scores are 
calculated as the probabilities of the treatment statuses (B1, B2, B3 or B4) occurring in 
each subsample, under the condition that two events might occur, (B0, B1), (B0, B2), 
(B0, B3) and (B0, B4). In each case, firms classified as non-treated group (B0) have 
lower probabilities, while treated firms (B1, B2, B3, and B4) have relatively higher 
probabilities. Besides, the distributions of conditional propensity scores for treated and 
non-treated groups are sufficiently overlapped in all cases. Therefore, it can be 
interpreted that all the matched non-treated samples have similar propensity scores. The 
results of PSM-DID are as shown in Table 6. The estimation results from caliper 
matching are shown in the upper table and those from the nearest neighbor matching are 
shown in the bottom table in the same way. 
The results demonstrate that the treatment effects of INVEST are not so small. The 
estimated values from caliper matching show that firms in categories B2 and B3 
decreased investment rates by 3.1% and 4.1% more than the control firms did. Firms in 
B4, on the other hand, increased their investment rate by 3.8%. Nevertheless, they 
remain insignificant and these tendencies were not altered by an alternate matching 
method.
16  Likewise, the changes in RATE were not different for the treated and control 
firms. However, the estimation results for bank loan balances (lnLOAN, lnLONG, and 
lnSHORT) are noteworthy. First, the estimated ATTs of lnLOAN show apparent and 
significant increments for firms in categories B3 and B4. Specifically, the total bank 
loan balances rose, on average, by 11% for the former and 18% for the latter. The ATTs 
of the compositions of bank loans (lnLONG and lnSHORT), on the other hand, are 
                                                  
16 Since no large differences are observed between the two methods, the results from caliper 
matching are explained hereafter. 16 
 
somewhat different between categories. For firms in B3, the short-term bank loan 
balances increased sharply (44%) while large increments in the long-term bank loan 
balance (37%) were observed for firms in B4. 
The above empirical findings demonstrate that there is no strong evidence that treated 
firms become financially constrained during the crisis and the more the number of 
maturing bonds they had, the more bank loans were supplied without a corresponding 
rise in borrowing costs. This paper interprets these facts as follows: (1) firms that had 
reduced bank-dependency were also supplied with bank loans without the imposition of 
high lemon premiums; (2) the bank loan supply was plentiful enough to have prevented 
firms from being financial constrained; and (3) the problem of asymmetric information 
between banks and firms is not serious for recent Japanese listed firms. 
In the following subsections, I reinforce the empirical evidence. Specifically, I check 
if the treatment statuses are randomized, whether the findings are unique to the crisis 
period, and review the predictability of the crisis. 
 
4.1 Balancing Tests 
The trustworthiness of above empirical results depends on whether the treatment 
statuses are randomized or not. In other words, they need to satisfy the conditions 
shown in (6). To check them statistically, I employ two tests proposed in Caliendo and 
Kopeinig (2008): the standardized bias (SB) test and the pseudo R-squared test. The 
former checks whether the differences in each covariate are small on average by 
calculating the mean and median absolute values of SB indicators defined as follows. 
    .
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   (7) 
Here l and m indicate the treated and control firms respectively and k stands for the k-th 
covariates. Their medians or means are required to be less than 5% after matching. The 
pseudo R-squared test proposed by Sianesi (2004) is similar to the former in its basic 
ideas. For each l and m, we regress 1(S=l | S=l, or, S=m) on covariates X by probit model 
after matching to test the null hypothesis that all the coefficients on X are zero. If the 
balancing condition holds, then the null hypothesis will be rejected and pseudo 17 
 
R-squared will be adequately small because the covariates no longer have the ability to 
predict treatment statuses under the condition. 
The results of these tests are shown in Table 7. Both tests suggest that the balancing 
conditions are satisfied after matching; that is, the medians and means of SBs are all 
less than 5% in absolute value and the null hypothesis is rejected with large p-values for 
each subsample. These results imply that the selection of covariates is appropriate and 
the treatments are successfully randomized. 
 
4.2 Treatment Effects in the Normal Time 
Another interpretation of the empirical findings of this paper is that the phenomena are 
not special to the crisis period. That is, firms that have maturing bonds might also 
borrow from their banks to repay in the “normal time.” If this were true, the 
interpretations of this paper would be misleading. In order to eliminate this possibility, I 
estimate the same models for FY2005. This period is chosen not only was the Japanese 
economy enjoying an economic expansion at the time, but it had also recovered from 
the bad loan problem. 
Estimated PSM-DIDs shown in Table 8 are all negligible at the significance level of 
5%. This demonstrates that no strong differences in INVEST and the borrowing 
conditions (RATE, lnLOAN, lnLONG and lnSHORT) between the treated and control 
firms are observed in FY2005. Therefore, it would suffice to say that the main findings 
of this paper are unique to the crisis period. 
 
4.3 Could Firms Have Anticipated the 2008 Financial Crisis? 
As discussed in section 2, if the firms had anticipated the financial crisis, they could 
have avoided being “treated,” for example, by buying their maturing bonds back while 
the markets were normal. Then, in such a situation, the strongly ignorable treatment 
assignment assumption would be invalid. In this subsection, I examine this point by 
using the firms’ maturity schedules reported in the Nikkei-NEEDS database. Here I 
focus on two items: corporate bonds scheduled to mature in more than one year less 
than two years (FF044) and corporate bonds scheduled to mature within one year 18 
 
(FF043). If the global financial crisis were anticipated in March 2008, then the amount 
of FF043 could be expected to be smaller than of FF044, as reported at the end of 
FY2007. This paper, therefore, generates variable CHANGE defined as FF043 minus 
lagged FF044 and compares its descriptive statistics to earlier years.   
The results are shown in Table 9. The top section of the table shows that the average 
changes in maturing bonds were 0.9 billion Yen and its median was zero in FY2008. 
Besides, no large differences are observed comparing it to earlier years. In the bottom 
section of the table, the descriptive statistics for the subsamples of nonzero values are 
shown. This also demonstrates that the average changes were non-negative and its 
distributions and sample sizes were not so different from those of earlier years. 
Therefore, no strong evidence that firms could anticipate the crisis beforehand is 
observed. 
 
5 Robustness Checks and Extensions 
The estimation results in Section 2.4 demonstrate that changes in investment 
expenditures were not different between treated and control firms, while a sharp rise in 
the bank loan balances was observed for the former. This section goes into the details to 
check the robustness. First, I check whether the main results are robust to the selection 
of control groups. Second, I examine whether the outliers of outcome variables affect 
the estimated treatment effects through matching estimators. At the same time, I also 
investigate the heterogeneity of the treatment effects. 
 
5.1 Changing Control Groups 
In PSM-DID estimations, the treatment sample or the firms that had maturing corporate 
bonds are compared with the firms that had not issued corporate bonds at all. However, 
if there exist some unobservable attributes that affect both the decision on bond issue 
and outcome variables, the estimated treatment effects might be biased. For example, 
firms might refrain from issuing corporate bonds partly because they are afraid of the 
freeze in capital markets that might occur in the future. Such firms may have made the 
prudent decision to reduce their investment expenditures during the crisis period. If this 19 
 
situation were true, the estimated treatment effects in the above section would be 
erroneous.  
To consider this possibility, I re-estimate the PSM-DIDs, limiting the treated and 
non-treated groups to firms whose outstanding balances of corporate bonds are non-zero. 
If firms that had issued corporate bonds faced more severe information asymmetries, the 
investment expenditure for firms that had a large amount of maturing corporate bonds 
would have declined. Conversely, if the problem of asymmetric information were not 
severe, increments in bank loan balances were expected to be larger as the magnitude of 
the shock–namely, the amount of maturing bound–becomes larger. Since both treated 
firms and non-treated firms are limited to bond issuers in this case, their treatment 
statuses reflect the firms’ “luckiness” more precisely. 
In this section, I classified firms in B3 and B4 as treated groups (firms that had a 
middle or large amount of maturing bonds) while firms in B1 and B2 are combined into 
one non-treated group (firms that had a small amount of maturing bonds). Therefore, the 
number of treatment statuses is reduced to 4 in this case. I applied Lechner’s (2002) 
method to this 4-status model following the procedure explained in the previous section. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 10. Again, the treatment effects of investment 
expenditures were insignificant for both B3 and B4. However, significant increments in 
the bank loan balances were observed. Besides, the magnitudes of treatment effects 
were not so different from previous results. This implies that the problem, which might 
arise from choosing control firms from B0, is negligible. 
 
5.2 Median Treatment Effects 
As discussed in Section 4.1, the first differenced outcome variables show large 
heterogeneity. Since matching estimators are notorious for their weakness in dealing 
with outliers, I must check if they did not alter the main results of this paper. For this 
purpose, I also estimate the median treatment effects, which are known to be robust for 
outliers. These can be estimated by utilizing the usual median regression model when 
the treatment is exogenous but after controlling for covariates. However, this method 
needs functional-form assumptions for the relationship among outcome variables, 
treatment variables, and covariates. This paper assumes that they are linear and utilize a 20 
 
“dose-response” model (Koenker, 2005) by setting the variable MATURITY as a 
continuous treatment variable. Thus, the marginal median treatment effect ( ) is the 
solution of the following M-estimation: 
    . | |
1
min arg ) ˆ , ˆ (
,    
i
i i i X MATURITY Y
N
   
 
  (8) 
Another point is on the heterogeneity of treatment effects where the matching 
estimators indicate the average treatment effect, but treatment effects are probably 
dependent on the firms’ attributes. Especially, those for firms that kept relatively close 
bank-firm relationships among treated firms might be different, because the problem of 
asymmetric information between banks and firms are more or less mitigated for them. 
The literature on the Japanese main bank system also uses capital ties to measure the 
strength of the bank-firm relationships. Therefore, treated firms, whose banks are one of 
the major shareholders, are considered to have relatively close bank-firm relationships. 
Since the median treatment-effect models are more parametric than matching estimators, 
they enable an examination of this possibility at the same time.
17  To be clearer, I add a 
cross term (MATURITY*MAINBANK) to the above model and get   
  . | * |
1
min arg ) ˆ , ˆ , ˆ (
, ,     
i
i i i i i X MAINBANK MATURITY MATURITY Y
N
     
   (9)
where    indicates the marginal treatment effect for firms whose bank is one of the 
major shareholders (treated-A) and that for firms whose bank is not one of the major 
shareholders (treated-B). This is measured by     . This paper reports the result from 
this augmented model. 
The estimation results of the median treatment effects are shown in Table 11. To 
express the results visually, I also present the dose-response functions (DRFs) of each 
outcome variable with 95% confidence intervals in Figures 3 where the lines with 
diamonds are the estimated DRFs for treated-A and lines with circles are those for 
treated-B. The DRFs verify that the results obtained by matching estimators are 
qualitatively unchanged and that statistical significance is maintained. It demonstrates 
                                                  
17 This flexibility is also one of the drawbacks of these parametric models because they are not 
robust to misspecifications (see Drake, 1993). Therefore, results from parametric models and those 
from matching estimators substitute each other. 21 
 
that the outliers do not drive the main results of this paper. However, on the issue of 
heterogeneity of the treatment effects, it shows large differences between the treated-A 
and treated-B. This indicates that the changes in investment expenditures were not 
significantly different, while those in total bank loan balances (lnLOAN) and long-term 
loan balances (lnLONG) were significantly higher for firms with relatively closer 
bank-firm relationships. If we suppose the value of MATURITY to be 0.2 for example, 
then the DRFs show that the lnLOAN (lnLONG) rose by 20% (23%) for firms in 
treated-A, while increments of only 10% (2%) were observed for treated-B. Besides, the 
DRF of lnLONG for treated-B is insignificant. The changes in borrowing costs, or 
RATE, also showed interesting results. For firms in treated-A, the DRF is not significant 
while, on the other hand, they were for treated-B, showing an increment of 18bps when 
MATURITY was 0.2. In addition, the null hypothesis that the difference between the 
two DRFs is equal is rejected at a small significance level.   
These results show that firms that kept relatively close bank-firm relationships had 
more access to bank loans; especially long-term bank loans with relatively low 
borrowing costs. For firms without such close relationships, relatively higher borrowing 
costs were charged and their access to long-term loans was limited. The changes in 
INVEST show that these differences in borrowing conditions were not serious enough 
to cause financial constraints. 
 
6 Conclusions 
This paper investigates the causal relationship between a firm’s bank dependency and its 
financial constraints by examining whether the Japanese listed firms with not-so-close 
bank-firm relationships were financially constrained during the 2008 financial crisis. 
The empirical results from matching estimators show that firms with large amounts of 
bonds maturing in 2008 did not cut their investment expenditure compared to 
bank-dependent firms. In contrast, their bank loan balances rose sharply without 
simultaneous increments in borrowing costs. However, when the heterogeneity of the 
treatment effects is taken into account, it comes to light that firms with relatively close 
bank-firm relationships among treated firms had more access to bank loans, especially 
to long-term loans with low borrowing costs. Although firms without such close 22 
 
relationship did experience a rise in their borrowing costs, the changes in the investment 
rates were not statistically different from control firms. 
These empirical results imply that there does exist a cost to reducing bank 
dependency, but it is not so high for recent Japanese listed firms. Existing literature, 
such as Chava and Purnanandam (2010), shows that the shocks in the banking sector 
affect bank-dependent firms’ performance negatively. Nevertheless, the results of this 
study demonstrate that the shocks in the capital markets in 2008 were offset by the 
banking sector and this prevented propagation to the real economy. In terms of policy 
implications, this research also demonstrates that a robust banking system can mitigate 
the effect of shocks in the capital markets on the real economy.   
The results of this paper also raise additional questions for the future research. First, 
in order to learn a lesson from the financial crisis, it is an urgent subject for empirical 
analysis to understand the cause of a capital market paralysis and the mechanism behind 
an international propagation of shocks. The second point would be to investigate how 
much it would benefit a firm to reduce its bank dependency. Since one of the main 
reasons why firms issue bonds is to reduce the banks’ monopoly powers, which are 
unobservable and reflected in the firms’ interest payments, we need more elaborate 
empirical strategies to deal with the possible endogeneity. The last point would be to 
assess the role of the credit lines. Firms with lines of credit must have relied on them 
during the crisis but lack of data on this prevented this paper from pursuing this topic. 
Nonetheless, it can be an important research subject to understand how the lines of 
credit functioned during the crisis period and what kinds of bank-firm relationships 
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Tables and Figures 
















































lnSHORT Short‐term‐bank‐loan‐balances: the natural log of short‐term bank loan balances.  
Notes: Codes in parentheses indicate the items of Nikkei-NEEDs.  29 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
N. of Obs. Mean Std.dev. min max
MATURITY 1880 0.0226 0.0647 0.0000 0.8824
B0 1880 0.6043 0.4891 0.0000 1.0000
B1 1880 0.0798 0.2710 0.0000 1.0000
B2 1880 0.1771 0.3819 0.0000 1.0000
B3 1880 0.0729 0.2600 0.0000 1.0000
B4 1880 0.0660 0.2483 0.0000 1.0000
Q(t‐1) 1880 1.1795 0.4915 0.4685 8.1068
CF(t‐1) 1880 0.1880 1.0115 ‐9.8500 18.6022
lnASSET(t‐1) 1880 10.8398 1.5964 6.4052 15.7568
CAP(t‐1) 1880 0.4405 0.1798 0.0211 0.8960
CASH(t‐1) 1880 0.3691 0.1604 0.0078 0.8934
RATING(t‐1) 1880 2.0441 0.8362 0.1009 6.4509
MAINBANK(t‐1) 1880 0.7590 0.4278 0.0000 1.0000
MARKET1 1880 0.5277 0.4994 0.0000 1.0000
MARKET2 1880 0.1351 0.3419 0.0000 1.0000
MARKET3 1880 0.1085 0.3111 0.0000 1.0000
MARKET4 1880 0.2287 0.4201 0.0000 1.0000
Outcome variables
INVEST 1880 ‐0.0282 0.3236 ‐5.6283 2.0107
RATE 1880 0.0003 0.0195 ‐0.2844 0.3025
lnLOAN 1880 0.0689 0.4860 ‐2.0867 2.8463
lnLONG 1880 0.0341 1.1540 ‐6.3986 7.5501
lnSHORT 1880 0.0810 1.4879 ‐9.4873 10.1581  
 
 
Table 4.1: Subsample descriptive statistics (covariates) 
All Subsample
B0=1 B1=1 B2=1 B3=1 B4=1
MATURITY 0.0226 0.0000 0.0000 0.0202 0.0712 0.2094
Q(t‐1) 1.1795 1.1696 1.1951 1.1652 1.2369 1.2255
CF(t‐1) 0.1880 0.2449 0.0735 0.1222 0.0540 0.1300
ASSET(t‐1) 227.93 100.41 360.98 447.94 560.97 276.53
CAP(t‐1) 0.4405 0.4814 0.4398 0.3286 0.3566 0.4588
CASH(t‐1) 0.3691 0.3993 0.3230 0.3010 0.3242 0.3809
SCORE(t‐1) 2.0441 2.2393 1.8268 1.6398 1.6983 1.9864
MAINBANK(t‐1) 0.7590 0.7544 0.8000 0.7508 0.7664 0.7661
MARKET1 0.5277 0.4877 0.6867 0.5976 0.5255 0.5161
MARKET2 0.1351 0.1549 0.0733 0.1111 0.1241 0.1048
MARKET3 0.1085 0.1162 0.1000 0.0871 0.1022 0.1129
MARKET4 0.2287 0.2412 0.1400 0.2042 0.2482 0.2661
N. of Obs. 1880 1136 150 333 137 124 
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Table 4.2: Subsample descriptive statistics (outcome variables) 
All Subsample
B0=1 B1=1 B2=1 B3=1 B4=1
INVEST ‐0.0282 ‐0.0272 ‐0.0321 ‐0.0357 ‐0.0435 0.0046
RATE 0.0003 0.0002 0.0011 0.0003 ‐0.0007 0.0012
lnLOAN 0.0689 0.0449 0.1250 0.0373 0.1385 0.2283
lnLONG 0.0341 ‐0.0092 0.1246 ‐0.0041 0.1027 0.3487
lnSHORT 0.0810 0.0584 0.2561 ‐0.0808 0.3163 0.2515




Table 5.1: Multinomial probit estimation (parameter estimates) 
Multinomial probit model
Dependent variable: 0,1,2,3,4
coef. p>|z| std.err. coef. p>|z| std.err. coef. p>|z| std.err. coef. p>|z| std.err.
B1 B2 B3 B4
Q 0.0959 0.1338 ‐0.0734 0.1377 0.2013 0.1630 0.0874 0.1592
CF ‐0.1297 0.1494 0.0203 0.0918 ‐0.1038 0.0832 ‐0.0544 0.0628
lnASSET 0.3305 *** 0.0609 0.3147 *** 0.0483 0.4052 *** 0.0578 0.2591 *** 0.0591
CAP ‐0.4032 0.4905 ‐3.6601 *** 0.4297 ‐2.4441 *** 0.5182 ‐0.1349 0.5900
CASH ‐0.9180 * 0.5578 ‐1.8435 *** 0.4056 ‐0.9797 ** 0.4779 0.0415 0.6177
RATING ‐0.3760 *** 0.1466 ‐0.2647 ** 0.1096 ‐0.2689 * 0.1414 ‐0.3684 *** 0.1305
MAINBANK 0.0222 0.1603 ‐0.2534 ** 0.1256 ‐0.1113 0.1654 0.0616 0.1768
const. ‐4.2253 *** 0.7782 ‐2.1283 *** 0.6142 ‐4.2584 *** 0.7678 ‐4.2103 *** 0.8449
Market_dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes




Log‐likelihood ‐1956.04  




Table 5.2: Multinomial probit estimation (marginal effects) 
Multinomial probit model
Dependent variable: 0,1,2,3,4
m.e. p>|z| std.err. m.e. p>|z| std.err. m.e. p>|z| std.err. m.e. p>|z| std.err. m.e. p>|z| std.err.
B0 B1 B2 B3 B4
Q ‐0.0152 0.0271 0.0094 0.0154 ‐0.0215 0.0237 0.0200 0.0166 0.0073 0.0170
CF 0.0159 0.0183 ‐0.0138 0.0173 0.0100 0.0165 ‐0.0088 0.0084 ‐0.0033 0.0065
lnASSET ‐0.0982 *** 0.0121 0.0231 *** 0.0067 0.0351 *** 0.0078 0.0280 *** 0.0056 0.0120 ** 0.0058
CAP 0.5984 *** 0.0952 0.0723 0.0550 ‐0.5973 *** 0.0713 ‐0.1705 *** 0.0495 0.0972 0.0607
CASH 0.3292 *** 0.0960 ‐0.0533 0.0634 ‐0.2913 *** 0.0686 ‐0.0521 0.0469 0.0674 0.0640
RATING 0.0943 *** 0.0251 ‐0.0299 * 0.0164 ‐0.0255 0.0184 ‐0.0132 0.0139 ‐0.0258 * 0.0134
MAINBANK 0.0323 0.0309 0.0094 0.0169 ‐0.0475 0.0229 ‐0.0071 0.0167 0.0128 0.0167
Market_dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes




Log‐likelihood ‐1956.04  
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. The marginal effects are evaluated at mean values of 
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Table 6: Estimation results of PSM-DIDs (Year 2008)   
      Method: Caliper Matching 
Treated=B1 Treated=B2 Treated=B3 Treated=B4
Control=B0 Control=B0 Control=B0 Control=B0
DID p>|z| std.err. DID p>|z| std.err. DID p>|z| std.err. DID p>|z| std.err.
INVEST t+1 ‐0.009 0.026 ‐0.031 0.030 ‐0.041 0.035 0.038 0.027
RATE t+1 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 ‐0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
lnLOAN t+1 0.027 0.047 ‐0.014 0.038 0.113 ** 0.052 0.180 *** 0.060
lnLONG t+1 0.096 0.105 0.042 0.089 0.152 * 0.092 0.367 ** 0.143
lnSHORT t+1 0.048 0.128 ‐0.177 0.109 0.436 *** 0.158 0.164 0.150
Method: 10 Nearest Neighbor Matching 
Treated=B1 Treated=B2 Treated=B3 Treated=B4
Control=B0 Control=B0 Control=B0 Control=B0
DID p>|z| std.err. DID p>|z| std.err. DID p>|z| std.err. DID p>|z| std.err.
INVEST t+1 ‐0.016 0.023 ‐0.035 0.025 ‐0.036 0.035 0.031 0.028
RATE t+1 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 ‐0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
lnLOAN t+1 0.024 0.046 ‐0.011 0.036 0.115 ** 0.052 0.194 *** 0.062
lnLONG t+1 0.085 0.102 0.050 0.083 0.122 0.084 0.395 *** 0.148
lnSHORT t+1 0.023 0.130 ‐0.150 0.108 0.471 *** 0.161 0.206 0.155
 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are calculated following the method 
proposed by Lechner (2002). Estimation results from caliper matching are shown in the upper table. Results from 






Table 7: Balancing tests 
(a) Standardized bias test 
Treated=B1 Treated=B2 Treated=B3 Treated=B4
Control=B0 Control=B0 Control=B0 Control=B0
mean median mean median mean median mean median
Unmatched 18.220 12.560 18.974 9.201 15.806 8.613 10.204 8.533
Matched 4.724 2.810 3.983 3.105 4.920 3.917 2.597 2.100  
(b) Sianesi’s pseudo R squared test 
Treated=B1 Treated=B2 Treated=B3 Treated=B4
Control=B0 Control=B0 Control=B0 Control=B0
R_squared LR chi2 p‐value R_squared LR chi2 p‐value R_squared LR chi2 p‐value R_squared LR chi2 p‐value
Unmatched 0.136 127.99 0.000 0.228 360.41 0.000 0.174 151.80 0.000 0.065 53.19 0.001
Matched 0.019 7.14 1.000 0.007 6.34 1.000 0.014 4.92 1.000 0.004 1.23 1.000 
Notes: In the upper table, mean and median absolute values of Standardized Bias (SB) are shown. In the bottom table, the values of 
Pseudo R squared and the Likelihood Ratio tests for the null hypothesis that all the coefficients from the probit regression of 




Table 8: Estimation results of PSM-DIDs (Year 2005)   
      Method: Caliper Matching 
Treated=B1 Treated=B2 Treated=B3 Treated=B4
Control=B0 Control=B0 Control=B0 Control=B0
DID p>|z| std.err. DID p>|z| std.err. DID p>|z| std.err. DID p>|z| std.err.
INVEST t+1 ‐0.002 0.017 ‐0.012 0.018 ‐0.100 * 0.055 ‐0.022 0.015
RATE t+1 ‐0.001 0.001 ‐0.001 0.001 ‐0.001 0.001 0.004 0.005
lnLOAN t+1 0.062 * 0.034 0.055 * 0.033 0.071 0.055 0.054 0.054
lnLONG t+1 0.049 0.068 0.034 0.065 0.057 0.101 0.018 0.093
lnSHORT t+1 ‐0.058 0.090 ‐0.070 0.108 ‐0.139 0.142 0.082 0.110
Method: 10 Nearest Neighbor Matching 
Treated=B1 Treated=B2 Treated=B3 Treated=B4
Control=B0 Control=B0 Control=B0 Control=B0
DID p>|z| std.err. DID p>|z| std.err. DID p>|z| std.err. DID p>|z| std.err.
INVEST t+1 ‐0.002 0.015 ‐0.019 0.018 ‐0.097 * 0.054 ‐0.014 0.018
RATE t+1 ‐0.001 0.001 ‐0.001 0.001 ‐0.001 0.001 0.004 0.005
lnLOAN t+1 0.049 0.034 0.057 * 0.031 0.062 0.053 0.055 0.055
lnLONG t+1 0.045 0.068 0.029 0.063 0.042 0.093 0.033 0.096
lnSHORT t+1 ‐0.073 0.092 ‐0.078 0.107 ‐0.143 0.140 0.092 0.115
 
Notes: *, **, *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are calculated following the method 
proposed by Lechner (2002). Estimation results from caliper matching are shown in the upper table. Results from 
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Table 9: Changes in the maturity schedules 
              CHANGE (Overall)
Mean 25 percentile Median 75 percentile Std.dev. N. of Obs.
FY2008 0.927 0.000 0.000 0.000 15.215 688
FY2007 1.138 0.000 0.000 0.020 20.838 669
FY2006 1.136 0.000 0.000 0.060 19.326 646
FY2005 0.846 0.000 0.000 0.054 14.981 595
  CHANGE (Subsample: CHANGE≠0)
Mean 25 percentile Median 75 percentile Std.dev. N. of Obs.
FY2008 3.021 ‐0.060 0.048 0.200 27.405 211
FY2007 3.239 0.010 0.068 0.200 35.111 235
FY2006 2.879 0.020 0.100 0.240 30.715 255
FY2005 2.064 0.020 0.081 0.206 23.369 244  
Notes: The unit is 1 billion Yen. The variable CHANGE is defined as “corporate bonds scheduled to mature within one year” minus 








Treated Control DID p>|z| std.err. Treated Control DID p>|z| std.err.
INVEST t+1 ‐0.0435 ‐0.0365 ‐0.0070 0.0310 0.0046 ‐0.0420 0.0466 0.0297
RATE t+1 ‐0.0007 0.0006 ‐0.0013 0.0008 0.0012 0.0009 0.0003 0.0021
lnLOAN t+1 0.1385 0.0557 0.0828 ** 0.0412 0.2283 0.0665 0.1618 *** 0.0584
lnLONG t+1 0.1027 0.0310 0.0716 0.0524 0.3487 0.0579 0.2908 ** 0.1325
lnSHORT t+1 0.3163 0.0596 0.2567 * 0.1552 0.2515 0.0077 0.2438 0.1835
 
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are calculated following the method 










Table 11: Median treatment effects 
INVEST RATE lnLOAN lnLONG lnSHORT
coef. p>|z| std.err. coef. p>|z| std.err. coef. p>|z| std.err. coef. p>|z| std.err. coef. p>|z| std.err.
MATURITY ‐0.0164 0.0368 0.0091 *** 0.0021 0.5125 *** 0.1689 0.1072 0.1532 0.3369 ** 0.1552
MATURITY*MAINBANK(t‐1) 0.0200 0.0458 ‐0.0066 ** 0.0026 0.5488 *** 0.2089 1.0493 *** 0.1904 0.3633 * 0.1923
Q(t‐1) ‐0.0131 *** 0.0032 ‐0.0002 0.0002 0.0291 ** 0.0146 0.0183 0.0132 0.0107 0.0124
CF(t‐1) ‐0.0013 0.0014 ‐0.0001 0.0001 ‐0.0147 ** 0.0068 0.0016 0.0057 ‐0.0051 0.0059
lnASSET(t‐1) ‐0.0003 0.0013 0.0000 0.0001 0.0083 0.0059 0.0149 *** 0.0053 0.0016 0.0054
CAP(t‐1) ‐0.0400 *** 0.0109 ‐0.0001 0.0007 ‐0.0847 * 0.0496 0.0345 0.0449 ‐0.1642 *** 0.0450
CASH(t‐1) ‐0.0020 0.0112 ‐0.0002 0.0007 ‐0.0663 0.0508 ‐0.0127 0.0460 ‐0.0666 0.0464
RATING(t‐1) 0.0016 0.0026 ‐0.0001 0.0002 0.0082 0.0119 0.0005 0.0108 0.0150 0.0108
MAINBANK(t‐1) 0.0042 0.0037 0.0005 ** 0.0002 0.0189 0.0170 0.0177 0.0153 0.0192 ** 0.0153
const. 0.0210 0.0170 ‐0.0004 0.0011 ‐0.1163 0.0783 ‐0.2926 *** 0.0706 0.0602 0.0711
Market_dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry_dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N. of Obs. 1880 1880 1880 1880 1880
Pseudo R‐squared 0.0086 0.0116 0.0411 0.0121 0.0075
F‐Test(1) F(26,1853)=2.6 F(26,1853)=4.01 F(26,1853)=7.64 F(26,1853)=7.76 F(26,1853)=5.29
(P‐Value) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
F‐Test(2) F(1,1853)=0.02 F(1,1853)=2.32 F(1,1853)=72.47 F(1,1853)=102.06 F(1,1853)=37.07
(P‐Value) (0.897) (0.128) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Notes: *,**,*** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. F-Test (1) tests the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are zero and F-Test (2) tests respectively the null hypothesis that the 
sum of coefficients on MATURITY and MATURITY*MAINBANK are zero. 35 
 
Figures 1: The volume of bonds issued 




(b)  Changes from year-earlier month 
 
Notes: The data sources are the Bank of Japan and the Japan Security Dealers Association (JSDA). The bonds that were issued in 




























































































































































































































































































Figures 2: Kernel density functions of conditional propensity scores 
   
   
Notes: The dotted lines and solid lines respectively indicate the estimated distribution functions for treated samples and control 
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Figures 3: Dose-response functions 




Notes: The dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals for treated-A and the dotted lines indicate those for treated-B. Standard 
errors for treated-B are calculated by the delta method. 

































































0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
MATURITY
l
n
S
H
O
R
T